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Abstract: Due to the increasing importance of communication networking, the 
power line (PL) channel has been considered as a good candidate for the 
communication medium. Power line communications (PLC) term stands for the 
technologies for the data communication over the electrical power supply 
network. The PL channels were not designed to transmit high speed data; 
therefore, they exhibit hostile medium for communication signal transmission. 
There are many factors such as noises, attenuation, distance, etc. affecting the 
quality of the transmission over PL channels. This paper presents PL model in 
the first sections of the work. Then it covers the security assessment of the PL 
system in the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) context. 
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1 Introduction 
Recently, there has been a big interest in utilising the PL channel for communication due 
to its potential to telecommunication users (Anatory et al., 2008). Power line 
communications (PLC) is using an existing power line (PL) system, i.e., this is great 
saving in cost and time. The general idea of PLC system is to modulate a radio signal 
with data and transmit it through PL channels in a different band of frequencies which are 
not used for supplying electricity. PLC technology can be divided into two categories; the 
narrowband and broadband communication. The frequency range of up to 150 kHz is for 
narrowband with the theoretical bit rate of kilobits (up to 2 Mbit/s). The frequency range 
for broadband technology is between 1.61–30 MHz with theoretical bit rate up to  
200 Mbit/s (Agrawal et al., 2011). The used frequencies and the modulation scheme are 
two main factors which have a significant influence on the efficiency of the system and 
also the speed of the PLC service. The best suitable modulation technique for PLC 
system is an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) (Agrawal et al., 2011). 
OFDM is a multi-carrier modulation scheme in which a single high rate data-stream is 
divided into multiple low rate data-streams. It is also modulated by using sub-carriers 
which are orthogonal to each other. The main advantages of OFDM are its efficient 
spectral usage by allowing overlapping in the frequency domain (reducing the bandwidth 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   106 A. Hosseinpournajarkolaei et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
by squeezing subcarriers until they overlap with each other) and multi-path delay spread 
tolerance (Agrawal et al., 2011). 
In this paper, in Section 2, the PL channel will be briefly introduced. Moreover, 
simulations on the PLC model are represented. In Section 3, PLC noise is outlined. And 
Section 4 would present the security assessment of the PL system in the supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) context. 
2 PL channels 
The PL networks usually classified as high-voltage (100 kV), medium-voltage  
(1–100 kV) and low-voltage (110–380 V). High voltages are not suitable for data 
transmission, therefore conventional fibre optics or wireless radio-link is used for 
transmission of this data over the existing PLs with repeaters used in MV networks to 
mitigate the effects of noise interference. Couplers then can be used to by-pass 
transformers when the power is lowered from MV to LV (Industry of Canada, 2012). 
Power grid consists of cascaded cables of diverse line lengths with a various number of 
branches of different line lengths and terminal loads. Switching on/off electrical 
equipment’s change the terminal load, i.e., it results changing the frequency response of 
the network. The effect of changes in the power distribution system topologies over the 
PL channels are investigated in Hosseinpournajarkolaei and Hosseinian-Far (2012). A 
simple topology for such a power distribution system was used to investigate the effect of 
variation in direct length, branch load, branch lengths and different number of paths. 
Figure 1 A simple LV PL network configuration 
 
Source: Hosseinpournajarkolaei et al. (2012a) 
The multipath model is a widely used model for investigating the data transmission over 
PL networks and is given below: 
( ) 2 /0 1
1
( ) . .k i p
N
j πfd Va a f di
i
i
H f g e e−− +
=
=∑  (1) 
where H(f) is the frequency response of the channel, gi the weighting factor, di the length 
of the data transmission path for various path numbers and N is the total number of paths. 
As it can be observed from the results in Hosseinpournajarkolaei and Hosseinian-Far 
(2012), variation in the direct line length from the transmitter results no multi-path fading 
as the channel response is a linear function of the frequency. The receiver can therefore 
recover the data transmitted using a single-carrier modulation transmission. 
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However, the multi-path behaviour in Hosseinpournajarkolaei et al. (2012b) indicates 
that multi-carrier transmission would be suitable for data transmission over the PL 
channel in case of varying the length AC with one branch. The increase in the direct line 
length AC reduces the channel bandwidth and its effect on frequency response is similar 
to the no-branch case, the difference being that the frequency notches are superimposed 
on the frequency response. 
From the simulation results in Hosseinpournajarkolaei et al. (2012b), it is observed 
that increasing the branch length BD increases the PL attenuation which is especially 
noticeable in higher frequencies. 
In case of multipath with different numbers of paths, from the simulation results for 
number of path 4 and 10 shown in Figures 2 and 3, it can be observed that the position of 
notches do not change. But as the number of paths increases from 4 to 10, the 
attenuations of notched points and signal distortion tend to increase. 
Figure 2 Multipath channel model with number of path = 4 (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 3 Multipath channel model with number of path = 10 (see online version for colours) 
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2.1 Narrowband technology 
The narrowband PLC are normally used in automation systems. The automation systems 
based on PLC technology are implemented with no any additional insulation of 
communication networks which results substantially reduction in costs for the installation 
and realisation of the new network within the existing buildings. The automation system 
in this system can be used in: 
1 central control of various home system such as controlling doors/windows 
2 controlling connected devices to the internal wiring such as lighting, air conditions 
3 the security function, sensor control (Hosseinpournajarkolaei et al., 2012b). 
Another application for narrowband technology is called smart metering. The smart metre 
system includes metres at the consumer site, communication medium between a service 
provider and consumer, such as a gas, an electric, or water, and data management systems 
in service provider site that make the information available. The smart metre transmits 
the collected data through PLC to a metre data management system for data analysis and 
billing (Consumer Focus UK GOV, 2013). 
Figure 4 The basic smart metering system (see online version for colours) 
 
 
Source: Fernandes and Dave (2011) 
If you get a smart metre in your house/building you should get the following benefits: 
• Accurate bills: the smart metre sends information to your energy provider on how 
much energy you have exactly used, so no more estimated bills. 
• Could help to save money: by knowing what you are using, and having an idea of 
which appliances use the most energy, you may be able to reduce your energy usage 
and save money. 
• A standard in-home energy display: has a small screen which shows your energy 
usage at any one time with no any additional cost. 
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• Reduced theft of energy: the energy theft detection is more easily therefore it can be 
easily prevented, meaning you will not have to pay for stolen energy (Consumer 
Focus UK GOV, 2013). 
2.2 Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
Nowadays, in order to achieve higher data rates in communication system OFDM which 
is a multi-carrier modulation technique is being used. In OFDM scheme, data will be 
transmitted by dividing a single wideband stream into several smaller/narrowband 
parallel bit streams. Thus the modulated sub-carrier narrowband streams are summed to 
form an OFDM signal. 
The narrowband channels are orthogonal vis-à-vis each other, and are transmitted 
simultaneously which results an increase in the symbol duration proportionately, and 
reduction on the effects of inter-symbol interference (ISI) which are induced by multipath 
Rayleigh-faded environments (Agrawal et al., 2011). 
Figure 5 Basic OFDM system architecture 
 
The study on the effect of number of branches in PL networks indicated the possibility of 
degradation of the channel performance. Therefore, in order to enhance the network 
stability and performance, the multi-carrier modulation techniques such as OFDM can be 
considered (Hosseinpournajarkolaei et al., 2012b). 
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3 Different types of noise on PLC 
In order to design high speed data transmission over PL networks details knowledge of 
channel properties noise are required. Due to the signal distortion, cable losses and 
multipath propagation the noise is known as the most crucial factor effecting data 
communication over PL systems. 
Normally, in LV PL networks, the source of the noise can be internal (inside the 
network) or external (outside the network). Overall, in BPL channels, the additive noise 
normally classified into five different classes; 
1 Coloured background noise: has very low power spectral density (PSD) which also 
varies with the variation in frequency and resulted by summation of number of 
different noise sources with very low power. 
2 Narrow band noise: normally has sinusoidal signals with modulated amplitudes and 
caused by ingress of broadcast station in short wave broadcast bands and the 
medium. 
3 Periodic impulsive noise asynchronous to the mains frequency: have a repetition rate 
between 50 kHz to 200 KHz in most cases and normally resulted by switching power 
supplies. 
4 Periodic impulsive noise synchronous to the mains frequency: with the repetition rate 
of 50 Hz or 100 Hz and are synchronous to the mains cycle and normally created by 
the power supplies operating synchronously with the mains cycle. 
5 Asynchronous impulsive noise: which sometimes has a very high PSD value of more 
than 50 dB above the background noise and is normally caused by switching 
transients in the network (Chariag et al., 2011). 
3.1 MATLAB Simulink model of different types of noise on PLC system 
• Asynchronous impulsive noise: to simulate the noise produced by turning on/off the 
electrical devices the scheme in Figure 6 was used. The maximal delayed used at 
delay block is 100 the M-ary of random integer generator was set to 100 with sample 
time 1/1,000. 
• Periodic impulsive noise: to simulate noise like that produced by switched power 
supplies, the scheme showed by Figure 7 was used. 
• Synchronous impulsive noise: as it can be seen in Figure 8, by adding a spectral 
colouring to the white noise together with a periodical rectangular signals 
synchronous impulsive noise can be modelled. This type of noise is caused by 
thermistors in light dimmers and copiers. 
The final model of applying different types of noises on PLC has been created with PL 
channel together with white Gaussian noise (Figure 9). 
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Figure 6 Asynchronous impulsive noise 
 
Figure 7 Periodic impulsive noise (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 8 Periodic rectangular signal 
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Figure 9 PLC noise together with Gaussian noise 
 
The PL channel model is modelled as a digital filter together with the source of 
interferences/noises. The PLC 16 QAM model with OFDM modulation which enables to 
simulate better data communication over PLs. 
4 Vulnerability considerations for the PLC SCADA 
SCADA is a combination of telemetry and data retrieval system and has existed long time 
before control engineering (Robles et al., 2008). Smart grids where the narrow band PLC 
is implemented are also vulnerable to threats associated with similar infrastructural 
systems. Ericsson (2010) points out that the threat SCADA arises in the access points 
(Figure 10) available in them. Moreover, the complexity the SCADA makes it difficult to 
consider the system of systems’ (SoS) frameworks for the security assessment. Knowing 
that the PLC model introduced above would be also exposed to security threats and 
vulnerabilities when it comes to application. 
Using Ericsson’s (2010) domain categorisation of SCADA, the following domain’s 
securities are considered for the above mentioned PLC model: 
a Public, supplier, maintainer domain 
 One of the main security considerations in this domain would be provision of 
appropriate encryption/decryption technique in order to avoid public access to the 
data transferred via PLC. Furthermore, the maintainer domain should be contracted 
in a way which avoids future potential eavesdropping scenarios by third parties. 
b Power plant domain 
 Injection from the power plant can be performed in various ways and the 
vulnerabilities and risks would depend on the system involved as the medium. 
Therefore, security consideration should be presented for each individual SCADA. 
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c Substation domain 
 Distance between branches and securities involved in losing data due to lack of 
repeater on the way should be considered in domain. A longitudinal analysis of 
potential extensions to the PLC, to the distance between branches and any probable 
amendments should be considered before implementation of the smart grid. 
d Telecommunication domain 
 Securing gateways in the smart grid is an area to be considered for implementation. 
Use of repeaters, electrical physical structures and the bridges used may also lead to 
physical security threat. Data does not pass into transformer and therefore the bridges 
are used. The physical bridge outside the transformed is subject to the main access 
point for eavesdropping. 
e Real-time operation domain 
 Noise as a result of increased attenuation which then leads to poor data is a major 
threat in the real-time operation domain. However, the physical unintentional threats 
such as systems’ failure should also be considered. 
f Corporate IT domain 
 Failure in the software used for the control system of the smart grid is susceptible to 
damage. Similar to any other information system, software is likely to be influenced 
by poor algorithm or external viruses. 
Figure 10 Access points to SCADA system (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Ericsson (2010) 
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5 Conclusions 
To conclude, this major project gives the detail knowledge of a current key issue in the 
field of PLC. Various effects on PLC (such a different number of paths) have been 
investigated. Different types of noise on PLC were modelled and simulated theoretically; 
and the threats and risks associated with the practical implementation of smart grid using 
the PLC is analysed. Domain classification is used for breaking down different facets for 
consideration. This would simplify the complexities and integrations involved in smart 
grid. 
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